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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20040731-CA
vs.
LOWELL SINGLETON,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18A-l(2)(a) and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)Q).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that an officer lacked reasonable

articulable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the detainment of Singleton?
The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004
UT 94, f 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially
for correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts." State v.
Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 15, 103 P.2d 699. This issue was preserved in the State's
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R. 67-56), and at the
evidentiary hearing (R. 97).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Constitution of Utah, Article I, § 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the dismissal of the charges against Singleton after the

Fourth District granted his motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Singleton was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug free zone

with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §5837-8(l)(a)(iii) (R 5-4). Singleton moved to suppress the evidence (R. 55-49). After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion and suppressed the
evidence (R. 81-77). A copy of the trial court's order is included in the Addendum. The
2

State subsequently moved to dismiss the matter with prejudice; and the trial court
certified that suppression of the evidence substantially impaired the State's ability to
prosecute the case and dismissed the case with prejudice (R. 87-86). The State timely
appealed (R. 89-88). The Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (R. 91).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 3, 2004, at approximately midnight, Officer Robert Welcker of the
American Fork Police Department was on patrol in a marked police car (R. 97: 7-8, 10).
Welcker had just "checked" a church parking lot and decided to drive through a trailer
park (R. 97: 8). Welcker testified that the trailer park was a problem drug area for the
city, particiularly at night, and that dozens of controlled buys and been orchestrated there
(R. 97: 8, 9).
As Welcker turned left to enter the area, he observed a jeep parked on the right
side of the road and two individuals standing in front of the vehicle (R. 97: 8). The two
men were later identified as Stephen Lundy and the defendant, Lowell Singleton. On
cross-examination, Welcker admitted that where the jeep was parked could be a logical
place for a visitor to one of the trailers towards the entrance to park (R. 97: 22).
As Welcker was approaching in his vehicle he observed "some hand-to-hand
actions. I have no idea what was occurring other than there was some hand-to-hand
actions" (R. 97: 12; 97: 22). Welcker testified that it could have been an exchange of
drugs (Id.). Welcker has also seen similar exchanges that were not drug related (R. 97:
22).
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Welcker stopped his vehicle behind and to the left of the jeep, which had its
engine running (R. 97: 10-11). Welckei testified that "As soon as I pulled up, stopped,
Mr. Singleton-he was facing my direction-kind of looked my direction and then turned
and walked off towards the trailer park (R. 97: 11). The other individual (Lundy)
"turned and walked back toward the passenger's side of the jeep" (R. 97: 11). Welcker
approached Lundy to speak with him and noticed that Lundy was kicking something
underneath the jeep: "He appeared to be kicking the snow. There was freshly laid snow"
(R. 97: 12).
After making contact with Lundy, Welcker yelled at Singleton-who was still
walking towards the trailer park and w&s approximately 100 feet away-to "stand still or
come back so that I could talk with him" (R. 97: 13, 25). Welcker admitted on crossexamination that he has used a stem voice-especially at night-in order to get individuals
to obey his commands (R. 97: 24).
Welcker testified that Singleton was free to leave and that he would have
continued his contact with Lundy had Singleton not responded to his command (R. 97:
13). Welcker did not convey to Singleton that he was free to continue walking (R. 97:
25).
Singleton returned to the vehicle and Welcker had him stand where he could be
seen on the left side of the jeep (R. 97: 14). Welcker detained Singleton while he talked
with Lundy and investigated the matter (R. 97: 14-15).
Lundy told Welcker that he had met the defendant to talk about giving him a ride
and that they had finished the conversation when the officer arrived (R. 97: 16). Lundy
also denied kicking anything (R. 97: 15-16).
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Other officers then arrived and "other contact was made with Mr. Singleton" (R.
97: 16).
Welcker then checked underneath the jeep and found a small baggy of what he
believed to be methamphetamine (R. 97: 16-17). Lundy immediately informed Welcker
that the two occupants inside the jeep were not aware of why he was there (R. 97: 17).
Welcker then informed Lundy that he was under arrest and Lundy was read his Miranda
rights (R. 97: 17). Lundy initially told Welcker that he was planning to sell the drugs to
Singleton (Id.). However, Lundy subsequently changed his story and indicated that he
had purchased the drugs from Singleton for $70.00 (paid in three $20 bills and one $10
bill) that was neatly folded in "fourths" (R. 97: 17-18).
During Welcker's intermittent contacts with Singleton, he was also informed by
Singleton that the two were meeting about a ride to Salt Lake (R. 97: 19). But that when
Welcker asked him why he wasn't going with Lundy, "Singleton really didn't have an
explanation why he had walked off instead of taking the ride" (R. 97: 19).
Welcker subsequently learned that their was an outstanding arrest warrant for
Singleton (R. 97: 19, 27). Incident to arrest, Welcker searched Singleton's person and
wallet. In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker found seventy dollars in cash as
described by Lundy along with other money that was "wadded up" (R. 97: 19-20).
Singleton denied any drug transaction with Lundy and refused to speak with Welcker
further (R. 97: 20).
Singleton and Lundy were subsequently transported to the Utah County Jail by
Officer William Loveridge (R 97: 21). Eight days later Loveridge found 15 baggies
containing a white powdery substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. This was
the same back seat where Singleton had Deen sitting and nobody had been in the back of
5

Loveridge's patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to the jail (R.
73).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion based on reasonable articulable facts to justify the level two detention of
Singleton and subsequent warrants check and search, and it was therefore an
unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution.
The record shows that the officer lacked specific articulable facts to support
detaining and searching Singleton and running a warrants check. The officer's reason
for detaining Singleton was Singleton's presence at a trailer court at midnight, a location
known to the officer as a high crime area in which drug trafficking was common, and
witnessing some kind of hand to hand exchange between Singleton and another
individual. Singleton asserts that under such circumstances, without more, the trial court
correctly granted his motion to suppress and subsequently dismissed the charges against
him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE
WERE NO SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE FACTS OF CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS
LEVEL TWO DETENTION OF SINGLETON
Singleton asserts that the trial court was correct in concluding that the officer had
lacked sufficient specific, articulable facts suggesting that he was engaged in criminal

6

activity and that the level two detention of him and subsequent search and warrants
check were violative of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the
Utah Constitution were created to protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.
Const. Amend. IV.
Because there were not sufficient reasonable, articulable facts that Singleton was
engaged in any criminal activity, the officer's level two detention and search of
Singleton, and the subsequent warrants check were unreasonable and violated
Singleton's rights under the State and Federal Constitutions. Accordingly, the trial court
was correct in granting the motion to suppress.
It well established that there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each
requiring a different degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Ray,
2000 UT App. 55, flO, 998 P.2d 274, see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The first level occurs when an officer approaches and questions
a suspect. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at f 10. An officer may approach and question a suspect
at any time so long as the person in not detained against his will. Id. The second level is
reached when an officer detains an individual. Id. The United States Supreme Court has
declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when the officer
has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (1996) (quoting
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702-03, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641-42, 77 L.Ed.2d 110
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(1983)). The third level is arrest, which requires that the officer have probable cause to
believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at ^[10.
Singleton asserts that trial court correctly concluded this was a level two stop and
the State does not challenge this conclusion.
Effecting a level two detention, searching, and running a warrants check on an
individual without sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity is a violation of both the Fourth Amendment and
Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991);
and Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453.
In granting the motion to suppress, the trial court found the following:
1.

On January 3, 2004, Officer Robert Welcker of the American Fork

Police Department was on patrol in a marked police car at approximately
midnight when he witnessed what he believed to be a suspicious
circumstance.
2-

Welcker observed a vehicle parked with the engine running and the

lights turned off at the entrance to a trailer park.
3.

Welcker knew this trailer park to be a high crime area in which drug

trafficking was common. In fact, Welcker had purchased drugs in this
exact location previously, as an undercover police officer.
4.

Welcker observed two people conduct some kind of transaction in

which they exchanged something hand to hand near the parked vehicle.
Welcker pulled his patrol car behind the parked vehicle. He did not block
the vehicle's exit.
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5.

As Welcker approached the vehicle, one of the individuals, later

identified as Stephen Lundy turned and walked to the passenger side of the
vehicle. The second individual, later identified as the defendant, Lowell
Singleton turned and walked towards the trailer court.
6.

Welcker got out of his patrol car and approached the vehicle. As he

approached the vehicle he saw Lundy kick something into the snow under
the car.
7.

Welcker asked Lundy to approach him at the rear of the vehicle and

commanded Singleton in a stern voice to come back to the vehicle.
8.

Welcker detained Singleton while he talked with Lundy and

investigated the matter.
9.

After obtaining a statement from Lundy, Welcker searched

Singleton's person and wallet. In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker
found seventy dollars in cash.
10.

During his investigation Welcker located a warrant for Singleton's

arrest. Singleton was arrested on the warrant and transported to jail by
Officer Loveridge.
11.

Welcker's detention of Singleton's person lasted approximately 15

minutes in its entirety.
12.

On January 11,8 days after Singleton was arrested and transported

to the jail, Loveridge found 15 baggies containing a white powdery
substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle. This was the same back
seat where Singleton had been sitting and nobody had been in the back of

9

Loveridge's patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to
the jail.
(R. 81-79). The State has not challenged these factual findings on appeal, therefore this
Court must assume these findings are correct.
The two cases cited by the State to support their position that the circumstances
under which the officer detained Singleton were supported by reasonable, articulable
suspicion are distinguishable from the case at hand. In State v. Beach, 2002 UT App
160, Tj 2, 47 P.3d 932, the officer observed occupants of a vehicle which had no license
plates, on a street with a known drug house, parked in a manner that obstructed traffic,
make a hand-to-hand transaction with a pedestrian who walked away rapidly as the
police car turned around to park behind the other vehicle. Because the road was so
narrow, the officers had to slow their vehicle to five miles per hour in order to get around
the car. Id. While passing the vehicle, the officers noticed the defendant pass something
to one of the two individuals in the car. Id. One officer noted that the exchange drew his
attention because "it was accomplished in a manner that is commonly used in drug
transactions." Id. at ^ 2, 9. This Court found that such facts constituted articulable,
reasonable suspicion to justify a detention.
In the second case, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d
570 (2000), officers from the special operations section of the Chicago police
department-in a four vehicle caravan-converged on an area "known for heavy narcotics
trafficking in order to investigate drug transactions" expecting "to find a crowd of people
in the area, including lookouts and customers." 120 S.Ct. at 674. Two officers saw
defendant standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. Id. at 675. When
Defendant saw the officers, he ran away. Id. The officers pursued defendant, stopped
10

him, and frisked him, uncovering a .38 caliber handgun with five live rounds of
ammunition. Id. The Supreme Court noted that presence in an area of expected criminal
activity is not enough to support a finding of reasonable suspicion but rather location is
one relevant contextual consideration in making such a determination. Id. (citing Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), md Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed. 612 (1972)). In reaching its decision that the
officers' action in this case was supported by reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court
relied on the importance of the defendant's act of "headlong flight." Id. at 676-677.
The case at hand is distinguishable from the above cases in many respects. First,
unlike the situation in Beach, in the case at hand there wasn't a car without license plates,
parked in a manner that obstructed traffic. In other words, Welcker had observed no
violations-or potential violations—of traffic laws. The jeep in this case which was
simply parked outside a trailer court (R. 80).
Second, in contrast to Beach and Wardlow, Singleton was not involved in
"headlong flight" or even "walking away rapidly." Rather, the trial court's findings
indicate that as Officer Welcker approached the vehicle, Singleton turned and walked
towards the trailer court. (R. 80 If 5). In Wardlow, the Court recognized that nervous,
evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, and that
"headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion. It is not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such." Wardlow, at
124, 120 S.Ct. at 676. Unlike the defendants in Beach and Wardlow however,
Singleton's action of simply walking away cannot be considered in the same nervous,
evasive class as "headlong flight" or even "walking away rapidly," particularly when
Officer Welcker acknowledged that he hadn't observed Singleton doing anything that he
11

construed as nervous behavior prior to asking him to come back to the vehicle. (R. 97 at
24).
Finally, as opposed to the situations in Beach and Wardlow, it appears that in this
case Officer Welcker did not himself seem to believe he had observed specific,
articulable criminal behavior on the part of Singleton to justify effecting a level two
detention. During direct examination Officer Welcker testified that, in asking Singleton
to return to the car, he recalled saying something like, "Sir, can you come back here,
please" and stated that Singleton was not under arrest and was free to leave at that point.
(R. 97 at 13). Furthermore, he testified that Singleton could have continued to walk
away and he would have remained focused on his questioning of Lundy, whom the
officer had observed kick something underneath the vehicle. (R. 97 at 12, 13). The trial
judge also heard Officer Welcker testify during direct examination somewhat
equivocally, that after he had stopped his vehicle, he had "no idea what was occurring
there other than there was some hand-to-hand actions." (R. 97 at 12). In response to the
follow-up question of whether in his training and experience as a narcotics officer, could
this possibly be an exchange of drugs, he responded that "[i]t could be." (R. 97 at 12).
Welcker also acknowledged that he had also seen similar exchanges that were not drug
related (R. 97: 22). This testimony, taken as a whole, is not the testimony of an officer
who asserts, let alone believes, there was sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify a level two detention of Singleton.
Accordingly, Singleton asserts that the trial court was correct in concluding that
"the facts that Welcker relied upon for His belief that Singleton was involved in a drug
transaction "are not sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion" (R. 79 at ^f 2).
Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled-and the State has not challenged-that all
12

evidence obtained as a result of the illegal detention and subsequent search must be
excluded; and that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply. See, State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990;, and JVcc v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct.
2501, 81L.Ed.2d377.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Singleton asks that this Court affirm the decision of the
trial court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because the
officers actions were not supported by reasonable suspicion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of April, 2005.

^

Margare#P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellee to Jeff Gray, Assistant Attorney
General, Appeals Division, P.O. Box
th
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this 8 day of April, 2005.
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W THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JTATEOFUTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

s.
Case No. 041400234
.OWELL SINGLETON
Judge ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD
Defendant.

This matter came before the court for hearing on defendant's Motion to Suppress on June
0,2004. The Defendant was present and represented by his counsel, Richard P. Gale. The State
ras represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Donna Kelly. The court heard from Officer
.obert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department and received by stipulation a type
Titten proffer of Officer Wilham Loveridge's testimony. Both parties submitted facts and law
resented in their memoranda filed with the court. The Court having considered the Evidence,
lotions, and Memoranda of the parties does hereby make and enter the following Findings of
act, Conclusions of Law, and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Zhe court finds the facts are as follows:

uty

1.

On January 3,2004, Officer Robert Welcker of the American Fork Police Department

was on patrol when he witnessed what he believed to be a suspicious circumstance. This
occurred at a late hour approximately . ^ ^ l l s 0 5 S . ( (K< 0 0
2.

VWSUCAJVKX^MA

.

Welcker observed a vehicle parked with the engine running and the lights turned off at

the entrance to a trailer park.
3.

Welcker knew this trailer park to be a high crime area in which drug trafficking was

common. In fact, Welcker had purchased drugs in this exact location previously^ (X S <M\

1 ^

{AAMH^co\t^r police, or£Bca&~*
4.

Welcker observed two people conduct some kind a transaction in which they exchanged

something hand to hand near the parked vehicle. Welcker pulled his patrol car behind the
parked vehicle. He did not block the vehicle's exit.
5.

As Welcker approached the vehicle, one of the individuals, later identified as Stephen

Lundy turned and walked to the passenger side of the vehicle. The second individual, later
identified as the defendant, Lowell Singleton turned and walked towards the trailer court.
6.

Welcker got out of his patrol car and approached the vehicle. As he approached the

vehicle he saw Lundy kick something into the snow under the car.
7.

Welcker asked Lundy to approach him at the rear of the vehicle and commanded

Singleton in a stern voice to come back to the vehicle.
8.

Welcker detained Singleton while he talked with Lundy and investigated the matter.

9.

After obtaining a statement from Lundy, Welcker searched Singleton's person and wallet.

In one of Singleton's pockets, Welcker found seventy dollars in cash.
10.

During his investigation Welcker located a warrant for Singleton's arrest. Singleton was

arrested on the warrant and transported to jail by Officer Loveridge.

11.

Welcker' s detention of Singleton5 s person lasted approximately 15 minutes in its entirety.

12.

On January 11,8 days after Singleton was arrested and transported to the jail, Loveridge

found 15 baggies containing a white powdery substance under the back seat of his patrol vehicle.
This was the same back seat where Singleton had been sitting and nobody had been in the back
of Loveridge5s patrol vehicle since he had transported Singleton and Lundy to the jail..
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court concludes that when Officer Welcker commanded Singleton to return to the

vehicle he was detaining Singleton which constituted a level two encounter. The United States
Supreme Court has declared that "a police officer may detain and question an individual 'when
lie officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be
engaged in criminal activity." State v. Chapman 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996) (quoting United
itates v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 702-03 (1983)).
The court concludes that when Welcker stopped Singleton Welcker suspected that
ingleton was involved in a drug transaction. However, the facts that Welcker relied upon for
is belief are not sufficient to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion.
The court concludes it was only after Singleton had already been illegally detained that
ingleton was searched and a warrant for his arrest was located and Singleton was arrested.
The court concludes that if Singleton had not been illegally detained he would not have
;en searched or arrested. Hence, any evidence found on his person and in the patrol car would
>t have been discovered.
The court concludes that the inevitable discovery doctrine as set forth in Nix v. Williams,
7 U.S. 431, 443-444 (1984) does not apply because the state did not establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that the evidence ultimately would have been discovered by
lawful means. Had Singleton not been illegally detained Officer Welcher and allowed to leave
the scene, Welcker would not have been able to verify Singleton's identity or locate the warrant
for Singleton's arrest.

ORDER
Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court hereby Orders that
any and all evidence discovered due to the illegal detention of the defendant including money
found on his person and evidence found in the patrol car be suppressed as fruit of an illegal
detention and search.
Signed this

_7 day of July, 2004

. \F IN RED /A.

Approved as to form:

?

W

^

^

\

Anthony W. Sdhofield \ • U ^ X a ^ ^ ? 'P
District Court Judge
"t ->>V
..^s*4i
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